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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE TESTS OF TRIBAL
ENTITY IMMUNITY AND THE CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
OF INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
Aaron F. W Meek*

I. Introduction
Supreme Court and congressional silence have presented state courts with the
opportunity to fashion tests to determine the sovereign immunity status of tribal
entities. State courts have crafted numerous and varied tests, ranging from
Washington's "bright-line rule"' to an eleven-factor test recently adopted by the
Colorado judiciary.2 What these state courts fail to recognize is the underlying
conflict between the tests they fashion and the self-determination of the Indian
tribes the tests affect.
Over the past fifty years, Congress has consistently promoted Indian selfdetermination and self-government.' They have reversed the failed policy of
termination and have made numerous enactments promoting the right of tribes
to create governments representative of their unique culture and heritage.'
Because the immunity status of a governmental entity is a reflection of the
conceptual and structural makeup ofthat government,' congressional promotion
of self-determination necessarily promotes the right and authority of tribes to
determine which tribal government entities are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Therefore, when states impose their conceptions of the boundaries of sovereign
immunity, either in the context of government generally or in the context of
how states believe tribal governments should operate, they impinge on tribal
self-determination.
When state and federal law conflict, Congress's plenary power over Indian
affairs is controlling. Consequently, state courts do not have the power to

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 147 P.3d 1275, 1279 n.3 (Wash. 2006).
2. State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 405-06
(Colo. App. 2008).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part III.B.
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make determinations of tribal entity immunity, and any decision that purports
to do so is substantially preempted by federal policy.
Part II of this comment recounts Congress's recent history of promoting
Indian self-government. Part III sets forth the allocation of power between
federal, state, and tribal governments. Part IV examines how various state
courts have imposed tests of tribal entity immunity upon tribes. Part V explores
the conflict between the state court tests and the balance of power in Indian
affairs. Part VI proposes possible solutions to the problem thus revealed. This
comment concludes in Part VII.
II. History of CongressionalPromotion ofIndian Self-Determination
Throughout United States history, Indian law has been subject to the ebb and
flow of a fickle Congress. The failure of Indian termination policy ushered in
a new era of congressional Indian policy. Over the past fifty years, both
democratic and republican congresses have generally united in support of an
overarching Indian policy of self-determination and self-government.'
Supreme Court decisions during this period consistently support this policy,9 as
has every President since 1960.o The federal government in its entirety has
encouraged tribes to fashion their own forms of government, representative of
their unique values and culture.
A. CongressionalPromotion ofIndian Self-Determination
The new era of self-determination views tribes as the "primary or basic
governmental unit of Indian policy" and recognizes the government-togovernment relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes."
Throughout this era, Congress has sought to treat tribes as capable government
units by empowering them to deliver services to their members under federal
grant programs.12 The success of these programs prompted greater Indian
involvement in the administration of programs for their benefit." Congress has

7. See infra Part V.
8. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 97-113 (Nell Jessup

Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005) (citations omitted) [hereinafter COHEN].
9. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985).
10. COHEN, supra note 8, at 98; see, e.g., DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY

343-45
11.
12.
13.

(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000); 114 CONG. REc. 5518, 5520 (1968).
COHEN, supra note 8, at 98.
Id. at 100.
Id.
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also passed numerous statutes empowering tribal governments.14 These acts of
Congress display Congress's desire to promote the "goal of Indian selfgovernment, including its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal selfsufficiency and economic development.""
The transition to self-determination policy originated when the federal
government began allowing tribes to administer federal programs for their own
benefit." The first instance of this transition occurred when Congress allowed
the Public Works Administration to make grants available to tribes under the
Public Works Acceleration Act.' 7 Then, during the Great Society, tribes began
to receive federal money, which they could use with more freedom because the
funding was not tied to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.'" From these humble
beginnings came many far-reaching pieces of congressional legislation enacted
with the goal of promoting self-determination. Certain examples of these acts
display a special concern for tribes' ability to fashion governments suitable to
their unique cultures. A seminal example of this concern is the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA)." ICRA extended many of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights to tribes.20 While Indians sometimes criticized ICRA "as an
imposition of Euro-American legal concepts on Indian systems," 21 Congress
passed the law in hopes of advancing Indian self-government. 22 ICRA was
careful to exclude certain provisions ofthe Bill of Rights from incorporation to
tribes out of respect for the "unique political, cultural, and economic needs of
tribal governments. . . . [F]or example, [ICRA] does not prohibit the

establishment of religion, nor does it require jury trials in civil cases." 23

14. See generally id. at 101; Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 n.5 (1987).
15. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987).
16. Philip S. Deloria, The Eraoflndian Self-Determination:An Overview, in INDIAN SELFRULE: FIRST-HAND AccouNTs OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN

191, 194 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 196.
19. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
20. Id. § 1302.
21. Deloria, supra note 16, at 201; see also COHEN, supra note 8, at 101-02 (citations
omitted).
22. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-64 (1978) (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 62-63 (citations omitted).
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Congress chose to exclude an Establishment Clause equivalent, in part "to
respect the theocratic traditions of some tribes."24
ICRA highlighted that many tribal cultures simply cannot be reconciled with
European systems of governance. Numerous examples exist of such
fundamental differences between European and tribal traditions ofgovernance.
For instance, the Hopi traditionally looked to village religious leaders known
as Kikmongwi for governance.2 5 It would be unthinkable, however, to have
such a governmental arrangement in the United States. The profound difference
between European and tribal culture is precisely the reason Congress began to
give so much deference to tribes' formulations of their own governments.26
Congress also explicitly recognized the importance of Native American
religion through various enactments. With the passage of the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978,27 Congress attempted to defend Indian
religious practices from federal land use decisions. Later, Congress continued
to recognize Indian religions by enacting the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act in 1990.29
After ICRA, Congress continued to embrace tribal governments with the
passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975
(1975 Act),30 and the Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994
(1994 Act)." The 1975 Act was a prime example of the new faith in Indians'
ability to manage their own social programs.32 This Act was the legislative
outcome of President Nixon's pivotal proposal to Congress that they reject the
previous policy of termination.33 The 1975 Act allowed tribal governments to
contract to internally manage health, education, economic development, and
various other social programs.34 Congress expressed its commitment to Indian
self-determination in the 1975 Act as follows:

24. COHEN, supra note 8, at 953 n.437 (citations omitted).
25. Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, the Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal: Conquest and
Endurance in the American Southwest, 1996 BYU L. REv. 449, 458.
26. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1996-1996a (2006).
28. Id. § 1996.
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006) (providing federal protection for and recovery of
remains and artifacts associated with Indian burial sites).
30. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of25 U.S.C.).
31. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C.).
32. COHEN, supra note 8, at 103.
33. H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 at 2 (1970).
34. COHEN, supra note 8, at 103.
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The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the
Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with, and
responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian people as
a whole through the establishment of a meaningful Indian selfdetermination policy which will permit an orderly transition from
the Federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to
effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the
planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and
services. In accordance with this policy, the United States is
committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the
development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of
administering quality programs and developing the economies of
their respective communities.3 s
Congress reached two important conclusions in the preceding passage. First,
it recognized that it is the federal government's special role as guardian to
establish Indian policy. Second, in a break from the previous era, Congress also
came to realize that the federal government's power to administer tribal
programs and economies is often best left unexercised in deference to tribal
administration.
The 1994 Act "was the culmination of the successful 1988 Tribal SelfGovernment Demonstration Project, which had provided selected Indian
nations with block grants and far greater budgeting authority."3 6 The 1994 Act
made the contracts for self-governance of social services available to all tribes
that are able to meet certain eligibility criteria." Combined, the 1975 Act and
1994 Act have been referred to as "a declaration of independence for tribal
governments.""

35. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (2006).
36. COHEN, supranote 8, at 103. The 1988 Tribal Self-Government Demonstration Project,
more commonly known as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, is
found at Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 (1988).
37. COHEN, supra note 8, at 103. To receive contracts, tribes must meet certain reporting
and audit requirements and must maintain wage and labor standards. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450c, 450e

(2006).
38. COHEN, supra note 8, at 103.
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Other acts of Congress have also explicitly endorsed tribal self-government.3 9
These enactments, in addition to those just described, clearly show the
importance of tribal self-determination to Congress. During the selfdetermination era, even acts seemingly unrelated to anything that could be
described as governmental are in fact premised on promoting selfdetermination.4 0 The acts of Congress over the past fifty years evidence the
implementation of the explicit policy of Congress to actively promote tribal
self-determination.
B. Government Entities as Essential Elements of Tribal Government
If Indian tribes are to be allowed to fashion governments of their choosing,
they must necessarily be allowed to enforce their own conception of
government entity immunity. Government entities receive immunity because
they come under the umbrella ofthe government itself.4 1 Whether these entities
are under this umbrella is a determination of governmental structure, which is
a question for the political society empowering that government.4 2 It is
therefore essential that Indian tribes be able to decide what entities are under the
umbrella of their governments if they are to be able to fashion the governments
they desire.
In Adams v. Murphy, the Eighth Circuit explained that "political societies,
like private corporations, can only act through agents, and to constrain those
agents is to constrain the society."" This statement displays the importance of
the ability to extend immunity to government agents to ensure the functioning
of a government. Indeed, tribes have already shown themselves to be capable
of utilizing their inherent sovereign immunity selectively to accomplish their
goals. For example, "[s]ome tribes have created separate businesses entities
that are not immune from suit. This has been a particularly useful tool for tribes
operating off-reservation businesses." Just as American government values
have been important to the development of state and federal government entity

39. E.g., Tribally Controlled Schools Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2511 (2006); Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988,25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006) ("(A] principal goal of Federal Indian
policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
government.").
40. See inffra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 43-44, 168, 170 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 43-44, 165-70 and accompanying text.
43. 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908).
44. Id. at 308.
45. COHEN, supra note 8, at 1286.
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immunity,46 so too must Native American cultural values be allowed to control
the extent of governmental immunity if tribes are to truly have governments
representative of their values.
III. Balance of Power in Indian Affairs
The power of states over tribes has increased in recent years; however, it is
well settled that Congress is the supreme arbiter in Indian affairs.47
Congressional power is exclusive and preemptive, and the inherent power of
tribes serves only to increase its potency as against states. 48
A. CongressionalPlenaryPower
Congressional power over Indians has been culled from the text of the
Constitution - namely, the Treaty Clause 49 and the Indian Commerce Clauseso
- and from the inherent powers of national sovereignty." Combined, these
sources provide Congress with what is described as "plenary power" over
Indian affairs.52
Early in the history of the United States, the Treaty Clause was the primary
tool used by Congress to interact with Indian tribes." While the use of treaties
has diminished relative to other methods,5 4 judicial interpretation of the treaty
power sheds light on the vast breadth of congressional power. In Lone Wolfv.
Hitchcock," the Supreme Court applied a principle from the Chinese Exclusion
Case5 6 to Indian treaties by finding that Congress could "pass laws in conflict
with treaties made with the Indians.""7 Essentially, Lone Wolf endowed
Congress with the power to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties. Lone Wolf

46. See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
47. See infra Part II.A-B.
48. See infra Part III.A-C.
49. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886).
52. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974). But cf Philip P. Frickey, DomesticatingFederalIndian Law, 81 MINN. L.
REv. 31, 35-36 (1996) (criticizing the theoretical origins of the doctrine of plenary power).
53. COHEN, supra note 8, at 393 (citation omitted).
54. See id. at 395 (citations omitted).
55. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
56. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
57. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565-66.
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went further still in its ratification of congressional power by holding that
"[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised
by Congress from the beginning, [and is] not subject to [] control[] by the
judicial department of the government."5 The political question doctrine of
Lone Wolf has since been limited, largely by UnitedStates v. Sioux Nation of
Indians,59 but there is still broad deference to the political branch, and Lone
Wolfremains good law with respect to the enormous power of Congress under
the Treaty Clause.60
In recent times, the Indian Commerce Clause has assumed a role as the
central justification for legislation regarding Indian tribes.6 ' The Indian
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." 6 2
Congress's expansive power under the Indian Commerce Clause is consistent
with the significant expansion of congressional power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause during the twentieth century.63 Even so, Chief Justice
Marshall observed that the Commerce Clause is "divided into three distinct
classes - foreign nations, the several states, and Indian Tribes" - and that in
forming Article I, section 8, "the convention considered them as entirely
distinct."' This concept of wholly separate clauses within the Commerce
Clause has allowed the Indian portion of the Clause to take on an even broader
scope than the Interstate portion in recent years.
Initially, the Indian Commerce Clause gave more limited power than it does
today; "[h]istorically, the clause was the basis for the Trade and Intercourse
Acts regulating trade" with Indians." But when the constitutionality of the

58. Id. at 565.
59. 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) (noting that any suggestion that congressional action is not
subject to judicial review is no longer valid).
60. See Frickey, supranote 52, at 44 (suggesting that Congress's plenary power over Indian
affairs is "immune from meaningful scrutiny under other constitutional provisions that
ordinarily constrain congressional authority").
61. COHEN, supra note 8, at 398 & n.58 (citations omitted).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
63. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
64. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (183 1); see also Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1989) (applying ChiefJustice Marshall's language
from CherokeeNationand finding that "the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses
have very different applications").
65. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
66. COHEN, supra note 8, at 396.
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Major Crimes Act"- which expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians
in Indian Country - was challenged in United States v. Kagama, the Supreme
Court found no power in the Indian Commerce Clause to pass the Act. 8 The
Court held that "it would be a very strained construction of [the Indian
Commerce Clause] that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably
in their reservations .

.

. was authorized by the grant of power to regulate

commerce with the Indian tribes."6 1
Subsequent cases have questioned this strained conception of Indian
Commerce Clause power to the point that Kagama no longer appears to be a
correct application of the Clause. In UnitedStates v. Lomayaoma,70 the Ninth
Circuit did not accept Kagama'sholding that there was no textual basis for the
Major Crimes Act." In direct opposition to Kagama, the Lomayaoma court
found that "Congress did not exceed its powers under the Indian Commerce
Clause when it enacted the Indian Major Crimes Act in 1885."72 The decision
in Lomayaoma followed shortly after the Supreme Court decided Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, where the Court stated that, "[i]f anything, the
Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the
States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause."
Even after United States v. Lopez,74 the question of "whether the newly reaffirmed limitations of the Interstate Commerce Clause also impose limits on
federal power under the Indian Commerce Clause"" seems to have been
answered by courts in the negative." As a result of the cases following
Kagama, the Indian Commerce Clause presently enjoys broad applicability, far
exceeding the colloquial definition of commerce and even exceeding the postLopez definition of commerce under the Interstate Commerce Clause. The
Indian Commerce Clause is now applied as a basis for regulating commerce,

67. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
68. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886).
69. Id.
70. 86 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996).
71. Id. at 146.
72. Id.
73. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
74. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and
providing the first limitation on Commerce Clause power since the New Deal).
75. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 778 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
76. See Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d at 146.
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expanding criminal jurisdiction, "protecting tribal cultural resources," and
regulating Indian gambling.77
One of the earliest bedrock Supreme Court cases on Indian law held that
Congress's powers of war and peace, coupled with its powers to treaty and
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, comprehended "all that is required
for the regulation of our intercourse with Indian[s]."78 Despite these wideranging textual powers, the Supreme Court still found the need to further
expand the power of Congress by recognizing inherent or implied powers.
These powers generally emanate from the Kagama decision. The Kagama
Court, in addition to finding no Indian Commerce Clause power to pass the
Major Crimes Act, found no other textual basis for the Act. 79 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court found that Congress could enact the Major Crimes Act based
on its inherent power as the guardian of the Indians.80 The Kagama decision
and inherent power have been criticized in recent years for their condescension
and lack of constitutional authority." Consequently, courts have tended to stray
from using Congress's inherent power as a basis for upholding legislation and
have expanded Indian Commerce Clause powers to fill the void.82
The inherent power of Congress has not been definitively disposed, but it is
now frequently couched in different terms to give it a more textual
justification83 and erase its patronizing origins. In 1973, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the
subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the power
derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes
and for treaty making."84 More recently, in 2004, the Court "[i]dentified the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause as sources of that [plenary]
85
power."

77. See generally COHEN, supra note 8, at 397 (citation omitted).
78. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
79. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886).
80. Id. at 383-85.
81. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 778 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Frickey,supra
note 52, at 34-35). See generally COHEN, supra note 8, at 397 (citation omitted).
82. Doherty, 126 F.3d at 778 n.2; see also United States v. Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142, 146
(9th Cir. 1996).
83. Cf Frickey, supra note 52, at 44 (citing Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490
U.S. 163, 192 (1989)) (noting that the plenary power of Congress is routinely assumed to be
authorized by Article I); COHEN, supra note 8, at 398.
84. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
85. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citations omitted).
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Whatever its source, federal power is clearly comprehensive in the field of
Indian affairs. Congress has the power "to legislate on [matters of] health,
safety, and morals within Indian country"" - even the power to terminate the
federal-tribal relationship altogether17 - and it has in the past imposed its will
directly on tribes without necessitating their consent.8 ' Furthermore, it remains
questionable whether this power is even subject to any meaningful judicial
scrutiny."
B. Exclusive CongressionalPlenaryPower
In addition to its plenary nature, Congress's power is also supreme to all
other branches of government.o Congress's power is described as "plenary and
exclusive"91 - "[t]he term 'plenary' indicates the breadth of congressional
power to legislate in the area of Indian affairs, and the term 'exclusive' refers
to the supremacy of federal over state law in this area."92 Particularly, for the
purposes of this comment, it is important to recognize the preemptive power of
federal actions over state actions.
The supreme power of Congress relative to states has been an element of
Indian law beginning with the first Indian law cases. In Worcester v. Georgia,
86. COHEN, supra note 8, at 398; see, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006);
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048
(codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006)) (protecting tribal
cultural resources); Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (2006) (applying certain
provisions in the Bill ofRights to tribes); Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,565-66 (1903)
(noting the power of Congress to unilaterally abrogate treaties with Indian tribes).
87. E.g., Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 564 to 564w-2 (2006).
88. Carole E. Goldberg, PublicLaw 280: The Limits ofStateJurisdictionOver Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 537-38 (1975) (noting that Public Law 280 was originally
imposed on Indian tribes regardless of their preference); Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565-66. But
cf Robert N. Clinton, There is No FederalSupremacy Clausefor Indian Tribes, 34 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 113, 237-46 (2002) (arguing that there is no justifiable basis whatsoever for the exercise
of federal power over Indian tribes without their consent).
89. See Frickey, supranote 52, at 44 (suggesting that Congress's plenary power over Indian
affairs is "immune from meaningful scrutiny under other constitutional provisions that
ordinarily constrain congressional authority"); see also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28,
46 (1913) (suggesting that "Congress's power to determine the tribal status of groups of people
is merely subject to the requirement that the determination not be arbitrary").
90. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
91. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,
470 (1979).
92. COHEN, supra note 8, at 398.
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Samuel Worcester appealed his conviction for violating a Georgia law requiring
him to obtain a license from the state to reside in Indian Country.9 3 The
Supreme Court overturned the prior Georgia decision and held that the Georgia
law in question was invalid because it attempted to govern Indian affairs.94 In
his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall recounted the deadlock that had resulted
under the Articles of Confederation." Marshall noted that "[t]he ambiguous
phrases which follow the grant of power to the United States, were so construed
by the states of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the power itself."96 The
adoption ofthe new Constitution eliminated the Articles' purported state-based
limitations on federal power." Therefore, the Supreme Court held that state
laws - particularly those of Georgia in this case - would have no force within
Indian territory." To support this decision, Chief Justice Marshall stated,
[T]he acts of Georgia are repugnant to the constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States. They interfere forcibly with the
relations established between the United States and the Cherokee
nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles
of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of
the union.99
After the decision, Georgia refused to obey the Court's order. 00 Despite this
insubordination, the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee reiterated that "the basic
policy of Worcesterhas remained."' The Williams Court admitted that courts
had modified the principles of Worcester over the years, but it still invalidated
attempted state court jurisdiction over an action against an Indian on his
reservation.' 0 2 The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the essential
holding of its foundational decision in Worcester.o3
The finding of supreme federal power in Worcester has borne the important
doctrine of federal preemption of state power over Indian affairs. Numerous

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
(1985);

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 538-40.
Id. at 561-63.
Id. at 558-59.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
Id
Id at 219, 223.
See, e.g., id. at 219-20; Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1973).
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instances of congressional action have indicated that states do not have
authority over Indian affairs in Indian Country absent congressional
authorization. For example, Public Law 280'" provides the federal
government's consent to states' assumption ofjurisdiction, implying that states
would not otherwise possess such jurisdiction.'o Furthermore, Williams relied
more on the power of tribal preemption than federal preemption, and the case
also represents the Worcester proposition that states generally do not have
power over Indians in Indian Country without authorization from the tribe or
Congress. The Williams Court stated that "Congress has ... acted consistently
upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of
Indians on a reservation," and "when Congress has wished the States to exercise
this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v.
State of Georgia had denied." 0 6
Federal preemption, which seemed relatively insignificant compared to tribal
preemption in Worcester and Williams, is now the focus of courts in recent
years. Federal preemption analysis, focusing on treaties and statutes, with mere
passing reference to inherent tribal power and the infringement test developed
in Williams, often determines contemporary cases.o 7 Two Supreme Court cases
involving the Arizona State Tax Commission which followed Williams serve
to illustrate this point: Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Commission'o and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.
Warren Trading Post, the first case decided, involved the question of
whether Arizona could tax "the gross proceeds of sales, or gross income" of a
non-Indian trading post in Indian Country, specifically the Navajo Indian
Reservation.109 The Court examined the enactments of Congress regulating
Indian traders and found that "[t]hese apparently all-inclusive regulations and
the statutes authorizing them would seem in themselves sufficient to show that
Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in
hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon
traders.""o The opinion makes no reference to the preemptive power of the
104.
U.S.C.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25

§§ 1321-1326 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a).
Williams, 358 U.S. at 220-21.
McClanahan,411 U.S. at 172.
380 U.S. 685 (1965).
Id. at 685-86.

110. Id. at 690.
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tribe. This case demonstrates the ability of the federal government to totally
preempt state action by saturating the area with federal regulation.
The question for the Supreme Court in McClanahan was whether Arizona
could "impose its personal income tax on a reservation Indian whose entire
income derives from reservation sources.""' The Court found the Williams
infringement test to be inapplicable by characterizing it as primarily useful in
situations involving non-Indians, which is not present in McClanahanbecause
only Indians were involved." 2 The Court instead focused on the various federal
statutes and found that they did not grant Arizona this power to tax reservation
Indians and indicated that Congress did not think Arizona had any such residual
power."' Therefore, in addition to preemption, McClanahandemonstrates that
certain state acts concerning Indians are not valid without an affirmative grant
of power from the federal government.
This final point from McClanahanillustrates that the presumption in the
preemption analysis in Indian law is the opposite of that used in preemption
analysis in other fields of law. Ordinarily, the presumption is that the state will
prevail unless contrary federal law is available." 4 In the field of Indian law, the
presumption is that state power does not apply in Indian Country without a
showing of sufficient congressional intent to grant jurisdiction to the state.115
Warren TradingPost and McClanahan amply demonstrate the affirmative
preemptive power of Congress; however, explicit congressional intent to
preempt state action is not a necessary element of federal preemption analysis.
In Ramah Navajo School Board,Inc. v. Bureau ofRevenue ofNew Mexico, the
Supreme Court, using federal preemption analysis, invalidated a tax on a
contractor working to build a school for Indians.' 6 One argument furmished by
the Bureau of Revenue in opposition to federal preemption was that no federal
acts specifically expressed an intention to preempt the state's authority to
impose the tax in question."' The Supreme Court flatly rejected this
implication and, as a guiding principle in preemption cases, asserted that
"federal pre-emption is not limited to those situations where Congress has

11l.McClanahan,411 U.S. at 165.
112. Id.at 179-80.
113. Id. at 175-77.
114. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1176 (3d ed. 2000).
115. COHEN,supranote 8,526-27 (citations omitted); seealso Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc.
v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982) ("The question whether federal law,
which reflects the related federal and tribal interests, pre-empts the State's exercise of its
regulatory authority is not controlled by standards of pre-emption developed in other areas.").
116. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 846-47.
117. Id. at 843.
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explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state activity."'" Later, the Court
seemed to specifically apply this concept to the federal policy of promoting
Indian self-government in Iowa Mutual InsuranceCo. v. LaPlante,stating that
"[t]he federal policy favoring tribal self-government operates even in areas
where state control has not been affirmatively pre-empted by federal statute."'
Ramah also stands for the proposition that state action need not specifically
interfere with certain provisions of a federal law for the state action to be
preempted. The Ramah Court essentially based its decision on the fact that the
tax could undermine the "clearly-expressed federal interest in promoting"
Indian education because the tax would raise the cost to the tribe of building the
school. 1 20 Therefore, federal preemption may be impliedly derived simply from
congressional acts promoting a certain policy objective.
Taken as a whole, Ramah does not require any explicit congressional
pronouncement of intent to preempt the state action in question and does not
even require that the state action specifically interfere with any provision of any
congressional act. The converse implication is that Ramah permits federal
preemption in cases where state action is simply inconsistent with the expressed
policy of Congress.
The Supreme Court has recognized broad federal powers of preemption in
Indian law based on the underlying policy of Worcester and contemporary
cases such as Warren TradingPost, McClanahan,and Ramah. In these cases
- all decisions of the Supreme Court - federal preemption analysis has
developed to allow Congress to preempt state action by saturating the area of
action with federal regulation, by showing an absence of congressional
delegation of power to states, and by showing the action's inconsistency with
congressional policy. Furthermore, it is presumed that state action does not
apply in Indian Country.12'
C. Tribal PreemptivePowers
While Congress has plenary and exclusive power over Indians, the inherent
power of tribes cannot be discounted. At the same time that the Supreme Court

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
See Ramah, 458 U.S. at 841-42.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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was recognizing the supreme preemptive power of the federal government over
Indian affairs, it was also reaffirming the preemptive power of tribes.122
The Supreme Court has trended toward emphasizing federal preemption
rather than tribal preemption.'2 3 Indeed, McClanahan characterized tribal
sovereignty as a mere "backdrop" against which federal preemption must be
applied.124 This explicit statement of Supreme Court policy coincided with
similarjurisprudential approaches to resolving preemption cases. For example,
in Warren TradingPost and McClanahan,the Court chose to focus on finding
federal preemption rather than tribal preemption.'2 5
Despite these assaults, tribal preemption is still a valid approach. Following
its decisions in Warren Trading Post and McClanahan,the Supreme Court
confirmed that tribal preemption could still be employed as an entirely
independent bar to state action.12 6 The Court found that tribal power could
invalidate a state law if the law "inflinge[d] on the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 2 7
IV. State JudicialInterpretationof Tribal Entity Immunity
Similar to foreign nations, "Indian tribes are 'domestic dependent nations'
that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories." 28
Their immunity predates even that of the United States, as they have retained

122. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561-62 (1832) (finding that the laws of
Georgia have no effect in Indian territory unless in conformity with actions of Congress or with
the assent of the tribe).
123. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
124. Id. But see Ramah, 458 U.S. at 848 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that when
a "state tries to interfere with a tribe's ability to govern its members," tribal sovereignty is more
than a mere backdrop); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1980)
(citations omitted) (finding that tribal sovereignty, in addition to operating as an independent
bar on state action, is an "important" backdrop to Congressional preemption analysis because
"traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence").
125. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
126. Bracker,448 U.S. at 142-43 (citations omitted).
127. Id.at 142 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959)); see also Iowa Mut. Ins.
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976));
Williams, 358 U.S. at 220) ("Ifstate-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands
would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are generally
divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law.").
128. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)); Kiowa Tribe
of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
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those natural rights of sovereignty not abrogated by Congress.129 Therefore,
"suits against Indian tribes are barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear
waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation." 30
The growing economic sophistication of Indian tribes has led them to create
or recognize increasing numbers of tribal government entities."' As with state
and federal government entities, tribal government entities have found their way
into the legal system, presenting courts with the question of their sovereign
immunity status.
A. The State Tests
In 2008, the Colorado Court of Appeals in State ex. rel. Suthers v. Cash
Advance and Preferred Cash Loans faced the question of whether two
companies should be granted tribal immunity. 3 2 To answer the question, the
Court of Appeals decided to fashion a test setting forth certain factors to be
considered."' In its quest to determine the proper test for Colorado, the Court
of Appeals examined the tests in use in several other states, including New
York, Minnesota, Arizona, Alaska, Washington, and Wisconsin. 13 4
Colorado's examination revealed the truly disparate nature ofthe approaches
taken by the several states that have addressed the issue of tribal entity
immunity.'3 5 The Supreme Court of Washington fashioned the most concise
test, which may also be the most objectionable, in Wright v. Colville Tribal
Enterprise Corp. The plurality in Wright created a test, later referred to in
Suthers as the "bright-line rule,""' which simply considered whether the entity
was "owned and controlled by a tribe, and created under its own tribal laws.""
This objective test does not in any way account for tribal intent. Alaska
adopted a similarly limited test in Runyon v. Association of Village Council

129. Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685,694 (1st Cir. 1994); Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
130. Citizen Band Potawatomi,498 U.S. at 509 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
131. COHEN, supra note 8, at 1280-81 (citations omitted).
132. 205 P.3d 389, 394 (Colo. App. 2008).
133. Id. at 400, 406.
134. Id. at 403-05.
135. Id. at 405-06.
136. Id. at 405.
137. Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 147 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Wash. 2006).
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Presidents,' but other courts have not adopted it. The Supreme Court of
Alaska was primarily concerned with protecting the tribal treasury.139
Therefore, Alaska considers the financial relationship between the entity and
the tribe to be of paramount importance.140
Other states have adopted more encompassing tests. Minnesota employs a
three-factor test that asks
(1) whether the business entity is organized for a purpose that is
governmental in nature, rather than commercial; (2) whether the
tribe and business entity are closely linked in governing structure
and other characteristics; and (3) whether federal policies intended
to promote Indian tribal autonomy are furthered by the extension of
immunity to the business entity.'4 '
In Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Education and Community Fund,4 2 New
York contended that "no set formula is dispositive," but listed a number of
factors that courts should generally consider. 143 Like Minnesota and New York,
Arizona and Wisconsin also consider a number of factors in reaching a
conclusion.'" Ironically, the most factor-intensive test was developed by the
dissent in Wright, and included eleven relevant factors culled from Ransom,

Runyon, Gavle, and Dixon.145
138. 84 P.3d 437 (Alaska 2004).
139. Id. at 440.
140. Id.
141. Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 294-95 (Minn. 1996).
142. 658 N.E.2d 989 (N.Y. 1995).
143. Id. at 992.
144. See, e.g., McNally CPA's & Consultants, S.C. v. DJ Hosts, Inc., 692 N.W.2d 247,25152 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (listing factors to be applied in Wisconsin as "(1) [w]hether the
corporation is organized under the tribe's laws or constitution; (2) [w]hether the corporation's
purposes are similar to or serve those of the tribal government; (3) [w]hether the corporation's
governing body is comprised mainly or solely of tribal officials; (4) [w]hether the tribe's
governing body has the power to dismiss corporate officers; (5) [w]hether the corporate entity
generates its own revenue; (6) [w]hether a suit against the corporation will affect the tribe's
fiscal resources; (7) [w]hether the corporation has the power to bind or obligate the funds of the
tribe; (8) [w]hether the corporation was established to enhance the health, education, or welfare
of tribe members, a function traditionally shouldered by tribal governments; and (9) [w]hether
the corporation is analogous to a tribal governmental agency or instead more like a commercial
enterprise instituted for the purpose of generating profits for its private owners"); Dixon v.
Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ariz. 1989) (declining to adopt a specific test, but
finding that all ofthe business's activities were unconnected "with tribal self-government or the
promotion of tribal interests").
145. Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 147 P.3d 1275, 1288 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson,
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Colorado ultimately decided to adopt the eleven-factor test suggested by the
dissenters in Wright, finding the plurality approach prohibitively restrictive.146
It is clear from the factors that Colorado intended to broadly consider the
aspects of each entity to determine whether it is truly an "arm of a tribe."' 47
What is also clear from Colorado's analysis is just how many very different
tests are being developed by state courts.
B. Comparison of State Tests for IndianEntities and State Entities
Effectively, the state court tests represent an apparently unconscious
application of European values to Indian tribes. The history of European
contact with Indian tribes is a history of colonization.' 8 Many of the seminal
theories in Indian law, including the almost artificial creation of the "domestic
dependent nation" status, continue to reflect and perpetuate European
influence;14 9 however, it has become clear during the era of Indian selfdetermination that Congress intends to reverse this trend.'s Unfortunately, it
is sometimes challenging for courts to break their ingrained habits. To
determine if and to what extent the application of state court tests of sovereign
immunity to tribal entities is colored by Anglo-American legal heritage, it is
necessary to trace the genesis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its
perpetuation in American common law after the Revolutionary War.

J., dissenting) (noting the eleven factors to be applied as "(1) whether the entity is organized
under the tribe's laws or constitution, (2) whether the entity's purposes are similar to or serve
those of the tribal government, (3) whether the entity's governing body is composed mainly of
tribal officials, (4) whether the tribe has legal title to or owns property used by the entity, (5)
whether tribal officials exercise control over the administration or accounting activities of the
organization, (6) whether the tribe's governing body has the power to dismiss members of the
organization's governing body, (7) whether the entity generates its own revenue, (8) whether
a suit against the entity will affect the tribe's finances and bind or obligate tribal funds, (9) the
announced purpose of the business entity, (10) whether the entity manages or exploits tribal
resources, and (11) whether protection of Indian assets and tribal autonomy will be furthered
by extending immunity to the entity").
146. State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 405-06
(Colo. App. 2008).
147. Id.

148. See generally COHEN, supra note 8, at 10-25 (citations omitted).
149. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of TribalSovereign Immunity
Under FederalLaw: Legal, Historical,and Normative Reflections on a FundamentalAspect
ofAmerican Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 683 (2002).
150. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in English common law from
the theory that the king "could do no wrong.""' It found its initial exposition
in the case of Russell v. Men ofDevon.'52 In this case, Russell sued all males
dwelling in the County of Devon for damages to his wagon sustained as a result
of a poorly maintained bridge.' The Court of King's Bench determined that
the County had a duty to maintain the bridge, but found the action not to lie for
various reasons that ultimately formed the original common lawjustification for
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.'54 The reasons given by the court were that
(1) [t]o permit it would lead to "an infinity of actions," (2) there
was no precedent for attempting such a suit, (3) only the legislature
should impose liability of this kind, (4) even if defendants are to be
considered a corporation or quasi-corporation there is no fund out
of which to satisfy the claim, (5) neither law nor reason supports the
action, (6) there is a strong presumption that what has never been
done cannot be done, and (7) although there is a legal principle
which permits a remedy for every injury resulting from the neglect
of another, a more applicable principle is that "it is better that an
individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer
an inconvenience."' 5 5
This theory was discredited in American law after the Revolutionary War
ended the reign of monarchs in America.'16 Yet, despite this apparent break
with medieval Old World mores, the doctrine still managed to take hold in
America, beginning with the 1812 Massachusetts case Mower v. Inhabitantsof
Leicester.'" Many other theories have since been advanced in an attempt to
justify sovereign immunity's continued existence in American common law;1 8
however, sovereign immunity has been widely criticized as irrational and

151. Denver v. Madison, 351 P.2d 826, 835 (Colo. 1960); Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm'n,
381 P.2d 107, 109 (Ariz. 1963).
152. (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B.).
153. Id. at 360-61.
154. See generally Men ofDevon, (1788) 100 E.R. 359 (K.B.).
155. Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795,796-97 (Minn. 1962); see
also id.
156. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 95 (1996); Evans v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of El Paso Cnty, 482 P.2d 968, 969 (Colo. 1971); Stone, 381 P.2d at 109; Madison,
351 P.2d at 833-34; Edwin M. Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J.
1, 39 (1926).
157. 9 Mass. (1 Tyng) 247 (1812).
158. See generallySeminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 95-99; Spanel, 118 N.W.2d at 799.
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unjuist,'59 and "[m]ost writers and cases considering this fact have claimed that
its only basis of survival has been on grounds of antiquity and intertia." 6 o
Indeed, some of the very justifications used in Men ofDevon have since been
used as criticism.' 6 ' Practical justifications for the perpetuation of the doctrine
typically focus on its utility in "protect[ing] the taxpayers against excessive
fiscal burdens." 62 This latter justification has been used, particularly by state
legislatures, as a basis for reinstating immunity in jurisdictions where courts
have come to reject the doctrine.'
Sovereign immunity, to the extent it is still upheld in American jurisdictions,
is thus likely based on theories inconsistent with the concept of Indian selfgovernment. One possibility is that sovereign immunity is based on a theory
derived from the medieval European concept of monarchy - the same
theoretical mindset that lent justification to the doctrine of discovery." The
irony of applying such a concept to tribal governments would be profound.
Another possibility is that the doctrine could be based on contemporary
American concepts of the proper role and liability of government. This basis
would hardly be less inconsistent with allowing Indians to determine the scope
of their own governments than the previous possibility, though certainly less
emotionally evocative. The essential point is that if state courts apply the same
justifications used to develop American concepts of sovereign immunity to
tribes, they are not only interfering with Indian self-determination, but are also
likely to be applying Anglo-American notions of the role of government to
Indian tribes. A comparison of Colorado's concept of sovereign immunity for
state and tribal entities should shed light on how this problem develops in
practice.
In Colorado, the state supreme court upheld state sovereign immunity until
overruling it in three contemporaneous decisions during the 1971 term.'
Following these decisions, the Colorado General Assembly enacted the

159. Stone, 381 P.2d at 109; Evans, 482 P.2d at 972.
160. Stone, 381 P.2d at 109; see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 98.
161. See Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 136 P.2d 480, 482 (N.M. 1943).
162. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-10-102 (2009).
163. See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Wis. 1962); see, e.g., COLO.
REv. STAT. § 24-10-102.
164. See generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
165. See Evans v. Bd. of Cnty Comm'rs of El Paso County, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971);
Fournoy v. Sch. Dist. No. One in Denver, 482 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1971); Proffitt v. Colorado, 482
P.2d 965 (Colo. 1971).
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Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) in 1973.166 By this enactment,
the General Assembly, essentially for public policy reasons, exercised its power
to partially restore the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 67 The General
Assembly specifically recognized that "the state and its political subdivisions
provide essential public services and functions and that unlimited liability could
disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of such essential public
services and functions." 68
The CGIA restored sovereign immunity by making it applicable to public
entities.'6 1 Section 103 of the CGIA sets forth the definition of a "public
entity";o70 however, Colorado state courts are still forced to interpret and apply
this term in practice. Hartmanv. Regents ofthe University ofColorado'7 ' asked
the Colorado Court of Appeals to determine whether the University of
Colorado, as "a state-created entity," was an "arm of the state" entitled to
sovereign immunity in Colorado state courts.172 The Hartman court noted that
the Colorado Supreme Court had adopted a new test to determine whether an
entity was an arm of the state for sovereign immunity purposes in Simon v.
State CompensationInsuranceAuthority.17 The Simon test required balancing
three factors: "how the entity is characterized by state law; the level of
autonomy and independence the entity enjoys from the control of the state; and
whether any judgment against the entity will ultimately be paid by the state." 74
Colorado's eleven-factor test for tribal entities is much more expansive than
its three-factor test for state immunity."' The final factor in the tribal test,
"whether protection of tribal assets and autonomy will be furthered by
extending immunity to [the tribal entity]," and the language preceding the tribal
test, suggest that the expansiveness of the test represents the state's good-faith
effort to protect tribes;'76 however, good faith is not the problem. All state court
tests for tribal sovereign immunity go beyond state power, but it is important

166. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 to -120.
167. Stephen v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 641 P.2d 295, 296 (Colo. App. 1981); CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-10-102.
168. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102.
169. Id. § 24-10-106.
170. Id. § 24-10-103(5).
171. 22 P.3d 524 (Colo. App. 2000).
172. Id. at 526.
173. 946 P.2d 1298 (Colo. 1997).
174. Hartman, 22 P.3d at 527.
175. State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 406
(Colo. App. 2008).
176. Id. at 405-06.
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to note that state court tests are both exercises of state power on tribes and also
effectively applications of European-American legal concepts.
It is
unsurprising that all three factors in the test for state government entities are
among the factors in the test for tribal entities. American judges have been
schooled in American legal theories, so state courts can logically be expected
to incorporate their deeply ingrained theories of government to tribes.
The difficulty that American judges would encounter in applying tribal
governance theories is manifest in the tribal entity immunity context. In
Suthers, the court noted that an entity is more likely to be shielded by sovereign
immunity if the entity furthers a basic governmental objective.' 7 Even
assuming this to be true from the tribal perspective, Colorado has no way of
knowing which objectives tribal members deem worthy of immunity and the
weight the tribe would place on particular objectives in an immunity
determination. A tribe may find that promoting housing is a much more central
duty of tribal government than, say, promoting education. A tribe may even
decide to apply an entirely different framework for justifying sovereign
immunity than those of European-based legal systems.
The preceding analysis of Colorado's tests for state and tribal immunity
shows why the tribal tests are at least in part an application of the state's
concept of government to tribes. In other words, they represent state action
upon tribal governments. It is unlikely that a state court could suitably apply
a tribe's concept ofthe role of sovereign immunity in its governmental structure
and it is nearly impossible for a state court to ignore its traditional EuropeanAmerican legal predispositions.
V. Analysis of the Conflict Between These Bodies ofLaw
Congress enjoys plenary power over relations with Indian tribes."'8 It has
utilized this authority to empower tribes to self-govern."' State courts have,
perhaps unwittingly, begun to encroach upon congressional policy by authoring
the various tests of tribal entity immunity. Ironically, it is perhaps due to
Congress's policy of enabling self-determination that tribes have created so
many governmental entities. The long and comprehensive history of
177. Id. at 405.
178. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551-52 (1974); Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe oflndians, 471 U.S. 845, 851
(1985).
179. See supra Part II.
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congressional intent to promote Indian self-determination is sufficient to
preempt states' imposition of tests on entities that may be elements of the tribal
government. Supreme Court decisions applying federal preemption analysis
support this assertion.
Ramah, which frequently drew on Bracker,sets forth the method for federal
preemption analysis. The analysis is not mechanical, but "[r]equires a
particularized examination of relevant state, federal, and tribal interests."' 80 In
Ramah, the Court held that "the traditional notions oftribal sovereignty, and the
recognition and encouragement of this sovereignty in congressional Acts
promoting tribal independence and economic development" governed the
federal preemption analysis of a state tax that would raise the cost to a tribe of
building a school.'"' The Court further held that "[r]elevant federal statutes and
treaties must be examined in light of 'the broad policies that underlie them and
the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
tribal independence."' 82 The Ramah Court found the federal policy of
promoting Indian education to be "comprehensive and pervasive."' 83 In coming
to this conclusion, the Court traced the long history of congressional acts
supporting Indian education.'84 The Court also described the detailed federal
scheme for regulating Indian education.' The Court ultimately held that "the
express federal policy of encouraging Indian self-sufficiency in the area"
coupled with "the comprehensive federal scheme regulating the creation and
maintenance of educational opportunities for Indian children" outweighed the
interest of the state in increasing state revenues.'
The federal interest in the preemption analysis of tribal entity immunity
cannot be limited to any particular field of federal policy, such as guaranteeing
the benefits of the forest to Indians, as in Bracker,'87 or the interest in educating
8
Instead, the federal objective at stake in state
Indian children, as in Ramah.'1
cases defining tribal entity immunity is the policy of promoting tribal selfdetermination, because sovereign immunity shields the sovereign - now

180.
(citing
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue ofN.M., 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982)
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)).
Id. (citingBracker, 448 U.S. at 143).
Id (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45).
Id. at 840.
Id. at 839-41.
Id. at 840-42.
Id at 845-47.
Bracker,448 U.S. at 149 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
Ramah, 458 U.S. at 839-40.
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generally the government, rather than a monarch - from suit.'" Therefore, if
a tribal entity is protected by sovereign immunity, it is because it is part of the
sovereign. Finally, because it is the nature of the sovereign at stake, the ability
of tribes to mold their sovereigns - their ability to self-determine the nature of
their government - is the fundamental shortfall of state courts' actions.
Federal promotion of tribal self-determination has been the overarching
federal Indian policy for nearly fifty years.190 During this period, there have
been many landmark acts of Congress, repeatedly and explicitly endorsing selfdetermination. Many of the most significant acts of this kind have been
previously noted, including ICRA, the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, and
the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994.191 From even a cursory reading of the
names of these selected acts, it is apparent that Congress has attempted to
promote tribal self-determination from many angles - civil rights, religious
freedom, education, and governance. In fact, even the limited federal policies
at issue in Bracker and Ramah can be described as subsets of the overriding
policy. Guaranteeing the benefits of the forest to tribes and supporting Indian
education are both efforts to empower tribal self-determination by way of
monetary profits and knowledge, 92 both of which are crucial to successful selfgovernment.' 93 It follows that all the acts of Congress cited in both Brackerand
Ramah to support their respective congressional policies can also be cited to
support the broader policy of self-determination. So central is this policy that

189. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
192. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 147 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 141.3(a)(3)) ("Among the stated
objectives of the regulations is the 'development of Indian forests by the Indian people for the
purpose ofpromoting self-sustaining communities, to the end that the Indians may receive from
their own property not only the stumpage value, but also the benefit of whatever profit it is
capable of yielding and whatever labor the Indians are qualified to perform."'); Ramah, 458
U.S. at 840 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §450a(c) (2006)) ("[A] major national goal of the United States
is to provide the quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities which will
permit Indian children to compete and excel in the life areas of their choice, and to achieve the
measure of self-determination essential to their social and economic well-being.").
193. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Jan.
8, 1789) ("[W]herever the people are well informed they can be trusted with their own
government."), http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/60.html (last updated July 22, 2010).
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nearly fifty years of changing congresses and presidents have explicitly
supported it.' 94
Fifty years of support is not as long as the congressional support for Indian
education cited in Ramah.' 95 Yet, throughout the Indian policy era that
continues to this day, Congress's major Indian acts have consistently supported
Congress's overarching Indian policy from all angles. If Congress's interest in
Indian education was sufficient for preemption in Ramah, it must be that
Congress's interest in tribal self-determination is sufficient to preempt state
interference with tribal entity immunity determinations. When coupled with the
obvious interest of tribes in their own self-determination - even if their interest
is merely a "backdrop" in the analysis - the state court tests become even more
suspect.
The Supreme Court has also recognized congressional intent to maintain
tribal entity immunity.'96 Significantly, despite the Rehnquist Court's hostile
disposition toward tribal sovereignty, one area that remained protected was
tribal immunity.'97 In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the state argued that no legitimate
purpose was served by extending immunity to tribal business ventures.' 98 The
state suggested that immunity "[s]hould be limited to the tribal courts and the
internal affairs of tribal government," or even that the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity be entirely abandoned.'99 Chief Justice Rehnquist
proceeded to examine numerous acts of Congress before determining that the
Supreme Court would not modify the doctrine of sovereign immunity.200 Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote,
A doctrine of Indian tribal sovereign immunity was originally
enunciated by this Court and has been reaffirmed in a number of
cases. Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with such
tribal immunity or to limit it. Although Congress has occasionally
authorized limited classes of suits against Indian tribes, it has never
authorized suits to enforce tax assessments. Instead, Congress has
consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine. These
Acts reflect Congress' desire to promote the "goal of Indian self-

194. See generally COHEN, supra note 8, at 97-113 (citations omitted).

195. 458 U.S. at 839.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Seielstad, supra note 149, at 664-65.
498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991).
Id.

200. Id.
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government, including its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal
Under these
self-sufficiency and economic development."
circumstances, we are not disposed to modify the long-established
principle of tribal sovereign immunity.20 '
In this passage, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognizes three central ideas. First,
he notes the considerable Supreme Court precedent upholding the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for tribes. Further, he notes congressional acquiescence to
the doctrine through various legislative enactments. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, he quotes California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians to
explicitly support that the purpose of congressional enactments is to enhance
tribal self-determination.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has cautiously exercised deference to
Congress in matters of Indian policy. In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
ManufacturingTechnologies, Inc., the Supreme Court re-examined the basic
vitality of the doctrine oftribal sovereign immunity. Justice Kennedy criticized
the conception and continued utility of the doctrine of tribal immunity. He
recounted that the doctrine was built upon an apparent assumption taken from
Turner v. United States,202 making it an almost accidental development.203
Justice Kennedy continued by questioning the practical basis for the doctrine.204
He found that sovereign immunity "might have been thought necessary to
protect nascent tribal governments from encroachments by States, [but] [i]n our
interdependent and mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends beyond
what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance."20 5 Nevertheless, he noted
that Congress "acted against the background of [Supreme Court] decisions"
establishing tribal immunity.206 Consequently, Justice Kennedy decided to
defer to the apparent congressional acceptance of the doctrine of tribal
immunity.207 The Supreme Court committed to refrain from altering the
principle of sovereign immunity as it applies to Indian tribes without prior

201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
203. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756-57 (1998); Turner, 248
U.S. at 357-58.
204. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-58.
205. Id.
206. Id.; see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §450f(c)(3) (2006) (mandatory liability insurance); 25 U.S.C.
§ 271 0(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2006) (gaming activities).
207. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760.
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congressional action. If the Supreme Court is committed to congressional
deference, state courts should be equally so determined. These decisions by a
Supreme Court often seemingly hostile to tribal sovereignty appear to indicate
just how fundamental tribal sovereign immunity is to the nature and concept of
sovereignty.20
Despite its deference to Congress on uncertain matters of Indian policy, the
Supreme Court has been active in supporting the clear policy of Congress to
promote tribal self-determination. The most notable example of this is the birth
of the Exhaustion Doctrine. 209 In National Farmers Union Insurance
Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the Supreme Court found that when
federal and tribal courts have concurrent subject matterjurisdiction, "the federal
court stays its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to
determine its own jurisdiction" because "Congress is committed to a policy of
supporting tribal self-government and self-determination." 2 '0 Later, Iowa
Mutual InsuranceCompany v. LaPlantereiterated the focus on promoting selfdetermination through the exhaustion doctrine while also noting that the
preemptive power of federal policy applies even without any specifically
preemptive act.2 11
In light of the strong federal interest in promoting tribal self-determination
and the concurrent interest of tribes in the same policy, states must demonstrate
a substantial interest to uphold their tests. In National Farmers Union, the
Court suggested that the federal and tribal interest in tribal self-determination
- which led the Court to adopt the exhaustion doctrine - would only be
outweighed by the state interest if exhaustion were sought in bad faith.2 12
Under this standard, it is possible that, in cases involving deplorable facts, the
state interest may prevail.213
It is clear that states are preempted from infringing on tribal selfdetermination, and the courts following the Supreme Court's deference to
Congress in Indian affairs would be wise to agree. Nevertheless, state courts,
like the Colorado Court ofAppeals in Suthers, have in many cases gone to great
lengths to implement tests that consider numerous factors relevant to whether

208. See Seielstad, supra note 149, at 713-14.
209. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
210. Id.
211. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-16 (1987).
212. Nat'l FarmersUnion, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
213. See, e.g., State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389,
394-95 (Colo. App. 2008). The fact scenario in Suthers is one example where the state might
prevail.
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a tribal entity is an "arm of the tribe."214 Tests such as these are no doubt
fashioned in good faith so that tribal entities are not arbitrarily excluded from
immunity based on a bright-line test like the one adopted by the Washington in
Wright.215 Yet, it is difficult for state courts to resist at least subconsciously
applying European-American notions of how government should operate to
tribal tests. These state courts fail to consider that tribes may deem a particular
entity to be entitled to sovereign immunity despite that it does not fulfill some
of the various factors comprising the jurisdiction's test. Therefore, state court
tests of tribal entity immunity are substantially invalid because they conflict
with tribal self-determination.
VI. Possible Solutions
Various possible solutions exist to the problem that has been revealed, each
with its merits and drawbacks. If Congress takes no action and state courts are
allowed to continue creating a framework to define tribal entity immunity,
tribes will tacitly cede foundational powers to states without contention. Such
acquiescence to continued state power would open an unwelcome avenue for
states to regulate the structure of tribal governments. Solutions to this problem
can be premised on federal or tribal action. Resolution of this issue has the
potential to be a defining factor in circumscribing the contemporary bounds of
the policy era.
A. CongressionalAction
The federal government, to the exclusion of state and tribal governments, has
traditionally held supreme power over Indian affairs.216 There has been little
indication of a shift away from the decades-old foundational cases and treaties
that largely established this power structure.21 7 Congressional action is
therefore likely the most practical way to stop the usurpation of power by state
courts. But because federal control over tribal economies has proven disastrous
in the past,2 18 a resort to federal power should be avoided.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Suthers, 205 P.3d at 405.
Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 147 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Wash. 2006).
See supraPart IILA-B.
See supraPart IILA-B.
See generally COHEN, supra note 8, at 88.
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One aspect ofCongress's plenary power is "[t]he power to abrogate or waive
tribal sovereign immunity."2 19 Congress could easily establish a framework of
rules to govern the immunity of tribal entities. Indeed, Congress has already
done so with respect to Indian gaming facilities.220 Under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA),"' gaming facilities must be entirely owned by the tribe
to function as an arm ofthe government and enjoy tribal sovereign immunity.222
Congress could follow in this vein by creating a general test of tribal entity
immunity or by targeted enactments similar to IGRA.
Similarly, Congress could authorize states to make the very determinations
of tribal entity immunity the states are currently making. Congress has the
authority to confer its powers over Indians on states, even without the Indians'
consent.223 This is considered a delegation of Congress's preemptive power in
Indian affairs. 2 24 The seminal example of this type of action is Public Law 280,
which, in its original form, endowed certain states with the ability to assume
jurisdiction over Indian tribes without tribal consent.22 5 Congress could act in
similar fashion to allow states to determine the sovereign immunity status of
tribal entities. Recently, unilateral congressional action has fallen out of favor
with the switch from the assimilation and termination policy eras to the current
era of promoting tribal self-government. 226 Therefore, Congress would likely
have to require tribal consent before a grant of jurisdiction would become
effective. With so many and varied state court tests failing to consider unique
tribal cultural considerations, it seems likely that tribes would object in some
jurisdictions. Alternatively, Congress could act to encourage other possible
solutions to this dilemma. For instance, the Indian Child Welfare Act has
authorized compacts between tribes and states to establish jurisdiction over
child welfare proceedings.227

219. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); COHEN, supra note 8, at 1285.
220. COHEN, supra note 8, at 1286 (Supp. 2009).
221. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168
(2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721) (2006)).
222. COHEN,supra note 8, at 1286 (Supp. 2009).
223. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 88, at 537-38 (noting that Public Law 280 granted
jurisdiction over Indian tribes to states regardless of tribal preference).
224. CoHEN,supra note 8, at 538.
225. Goldberg, supra note 88, at 537-38; see McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz.,
411 U.S. 164, 177 n.17 (1973).
226. COHEN,supra note 8, at 538.
227. 25 U.S.C. § 1919 (2006).
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In any case, some form of congressional action would perhaps be the most
authoritative way to resolve the conflict presented. If Congress were to
establish a framework for tribal entity immunity, it would certainly qualify as
totally preemptive action consistent with federal preemption cases in the vein
of Warren TradingPostand McClanahan. Any inconsistent state rules would
therefore be held invalid.
While congressional action may be the most authoritative solution, it may
not be the best solution. A resort to federal supremacy has the potential to be
just as harmful as state authority. Solutions premised on federal power could
potentially lead to increased BIA regulation at a time when the BIA is only just
beginning to emerge from the humiliating scandal of the Cobell litigation.228
Congress could also establish a mandatory test, but this would suffer the
considerable drawbacks associated with reliance with Supreme Court
opinion.22
Congressional action would signal a significant limitation upon the current
era of self-determination. The direct link between a tribe's ability to define
sovereign immunity and the tribe's ability to fashion its own government
cannot be overstated. Interference with tribal concepts of sovereign immunity
is an imposition and limitation upon tribal self-determination whether the action
is taken by state or federal governments. Indeed, federal action could
potentially be more detrimental than state action because a federal law affecting
tribal sovereign immunity would be a true indication by the holder of plenary
power over Indian affairs that the concept of tribal self-determination must be
limited.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to oppose federal action is the over two
hundred years of evidence of the effect of congressional action upon tribes and
tribal economies in particular, which contends strongly against a return to more
federal control over tribal businesses. In fact, Congress already attempted to
promote tribal economies using a framework based upon federal control during
the Indian Reorganization policy era.230 The Indian Reorganization era saw the
creation of a federally chartered corporation available to tribes pursuant to

228. Patrick Reis, Obama Admin Strikes $3.4B Deal in Indian Trust Lawsuit, N.Y.TIMES,
(Dec. 8,2009) http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/08/08greenwire-obama-admin-strikes34b-deal-in-indian-trust-1-92369.htmi. See generallyCobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
229. See infra Part VI.B.
230. See generally COHEN, supra note 8, at 84-89 (citations omitted).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

172

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act. 23 ' This is now one of the three
forms of corporations tribes can use, the others being state-chartered
corporations and tribally chartered corporations.232 Indian Reorganization did
not prove particularly successful. It created such a sense of hopelessness that it
was directly followed by one of the bleakest periods in the history of American
Indian relations: the Termination era.233 Federally chartered corporations have
also proven to have considerable drawbacks, which are unsurprisingly related
to the procedural obstacles to federal incorporation established by Congress. 2 34
In sum, the federal government could put a quick and easy end to states'
definitions of tribal entity immunity, but this solution would come with
consequences. It would inject federal regulation into an area where the federal
government has a tradition of failure.
B. Supreme CourtAction
As the Colorado Court of Appeals noted in Suthers, "[t]he Supreme Court
has yet to establish a test for determining when tribal immunity should be
extended to tribal corporations."23 5 While a statement like this recognizes that
lower courts would no doubt respect a Supreme Court decision on point, the
Supreme Court could not defer to Congress any more than could a state court.
More importantly, tribes should be quite wary of entrusting their fate to a
Supreme Court now led by a prot6g6 of Chief Justice Rehnquist.236
The Supreme Court would have to reverse considerable precedent for this fix
to be effective. Deference to Congress over the issue of sovereign immunity of
tribes has been one of the few aspects of tribal sovereignty that the recent Court
has declined to curtail.237 Nevertheless, the Kiowa Court expressed strong
disdain for the perpetuation of such broad sovereign immunity powers.'
One author has even suggested that, at the time of Kiowa, the Court may
have relied on extenuating circumstances when they decided to uphold tribal

231. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2006).
232. COHEN, supra note 8, at 1284.
233. See generally id. at 89-97 (citations omitted).
234. Id. at 1284.
235. State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 403
(Colo. App. 2008).
236. Chief Justice Roberts, the current Chief Justice, clerked for Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who is generally not highly respected by the Indian law community. See Alex Tallchief
Skibine, The DialogicofFederalismin FederalIndianLaw andthe Rehnquist Court: The Need
for Coherence and Integration,8 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 2 (2003).
237. See supra notes 86-89, 123-25 and accompanying text.
238. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
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sovereignty.239 At the time of the case, "Congress was actively debating
legislation that would effectively eliminate tribal sovereign immunity." 24 0 The
Supreme Court's strong language criticizing tribal immunity may have been its
attempt to communicate its concerns to Congress while remaining consistent
with precedent upholding the doctrine. 24 ' Now that such legislation has not
come to fruition, it is possible that the Supreme Court may not be so deferential
the next time an issue of tribal immunity comes before the Court. All of the
nine justices who heard and decided Kiowa expressed their hostility toward the
concept of tribal immunity. 24 2 Of those nine justices, five remain on the
Court, 243 and the substitution of Chief Justice Roberts for Chief Justice
Rehnquist hardly bodes well for tribal interests. 24
C. Agreements Between Tribes and States
Despite the plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes, states do have the
power to enter into cooperative agreements with Indian tribes; only cooperative
agreements affectingjurisdictional limits require federal approval.24 5 Aside from
this rule, authorization of the agreement under the laws of both the Indian tribe
and the state is the only requirement.2 46 Tribes and states have already
exercised their power to come to mutual agreement in many instances.247
From the perspective of tribes, the possibility that some alternative solutions
might lead to diminished tribal sovereignty without tribal consent may
incentivize tribes to endeavor to agree with states as to the nature oftribal entity
immunity. Additionally, tribes would benefit from the ability to craft

239. See Seielstad, supranote 149, at 711-12.
240. Id. at 711.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer remain on the Court.
BiographiesofCurrentJustices ofthe Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
244. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
245. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 590. See generally Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson
Timms, CooperativeAgreements:Government-to-GovernmentRelationsto FosterReservation
Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1295, 1320-28 (1993).
246. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 592; Mack & Timms, supra note 245, at 1313.
247. COHEN, supra note 8, at 589-90 (noting "agreements in a wide array of subject areas,
including enforcement of judgments, education, environmental control, child support, law
enforcement, taxation, hunting and fishing, and zoning") (citations omitted).
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agreements reflecting their unique values.2 48 The alternative, of course, may be
uniform federal regulation, which would seem to effect the replacement of the
theory of Indian self-government in favor of centralization.
States, on the other hand, could use this as an opportunity to legitimize their
courts' actions. They would likely also enjoy sufficient bargaining power to be
able to reach an acceptable agreement because of the alternative possibility of
Supreme Court or congressional action limiting tribal sovereignty.
Clearly, cooperative agreements would be beneficial to both states and
tribes.24 9 The absence of such agreements often leads to costly and timeconsuming litigation. Because states could validate their tests and tribes could
avoid the harsh repercussions associated with fickle federal policy, cooperative
agreements are worth exploring.
D. Tribal Understanding
The uncertainty surrounding tribal entity immunity has presented tribes with
a significant opportunity to take the initiative to establish the scope of the selfdetermination era for the future. The significance of this opportunity is
especially apparent because all of the non-tribal solutions to the problem are
accompanied by significant drawbacks for tribal interests.250
It is possible to certify the question of an entity's immunity to the tribe under
which it claims immunity. This process would offer the best assurance that the
intent of the tribe is paramount in the determination. It would be the best way
to promote tribal self-determination because the tribe would be solely
responsible for defining its governmental boundaries. Indeed, the importance
of including tribal intent as a factor in state court tests has already been
proposed.25' Unfortunately, this method may lead to very harmful factual cases
creating the worst possible result for tribes. There are certainly numerous
instances in Indian law of negative facts leading to damaging legal outcomes
for tribes. For instance, the issue in Suthers arose because two payday-loan
companies claimed sovereign immunity protection against claims that they
violated Colorado regulations designed to protect consumers from unfair
lending practices.2 52 It would seem difficult for the Supreme Court and

248. See id. at 589.
249. See id. at 589-94 (citations omitted).
250. See supra notes 218, 229-34, 236, 238-44 and accompanying text.
251. Gregory J. Wong, Comment, Intent Matters:Assessing SovereignImmunityfor Tribal
Entities, 82 WASH. L. REV. 205, 222-25 (2007).
252. State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 394-95,
401 (Colo. App. 2008).
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Congress to refrain from curtailing tribal authority in the face of likely public
outcry if tribes were to lend their immunity to such schemes.253
Instead, tribes could show considerable initiative by self-regulating, which
would be a meaningful preemptive strike against foreign impositions. Many
professional organizations in the United States have been very successful in
avoiding state and federal regulation by imposing self-regulation.254 Tribes
have already demonstrated the ability to act in their collective self-interest. For
instance, many tribes have adopted provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code.255 Provided that it is capable of being implemented in a manner
consistent with tribal values, adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code can
provide tribes with the benefit of an expansive and uniform legal
infrastructure.2 56 A collective tribal agreement to prohibit tribes from anointing
businesses that are simply attempting to skirt legitimate regulation by seeking
sovereign immunity would eliminate the need for state or federal imposition
and would demonstrate that self-determination is feasible.
VII. Conclusion
Despite many apparent good-faith efforts to fashion tests sensitive to the
peculiarities oftribal governments, state courts operate outside their realm when
they impose any test on tribal entities. Congress alone is vested with plenary
power over relations with Indian tribes. This power is supreme to and
preemptive of state power.
Through their enactments reversing many years of failed policy hostile to
Indian government, Congress has determined that Indian tribes should be
afforded the ability to self-govern. This intent has stood the test of time and
even weathered the Supreme Court most hostile to tribal sovereignty. State
court tests of tribal entity immunity are therefore entirely incompatible with
Congress's long-standing policy of encouraging tribal self-determination and
self-government. Where incompatibility exists between state and federal

253. Cf Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 n.21
(1985) (suggesting that congressional policy supporting tribal self-determination might not
justify the exhaustion doctrine where the assertion of initial tribal jurisdiction is made in bad
faith).
254. See Jeff Storey, Note, Does EthicsMake GoodLaw? A CaseStudy, 19 CARDOZO ARTS
&ENT.

L.J. 467, 469-70 (2001).

255. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 1289-90 (citations omitted).
256. See id. (citations omitted).
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interests in Indian law, the federal interest prevails.25 7 Thus, the state court tests
are substantially preempted and invalid. Tribes must take the initiative and
internally address the problems associated with tribal entity immunity or they
will cede further power and much of the mandate of self-determination.

257. See supra Part III.B.
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